Supermarket policies on less-healthy food at checkouts: Natural experimental evaluation using interrupted time series analyses of purchases by Ejlerskov KT et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Supermarket policies on less-healthy food at
checkouts: Natural experimental evaluation
using interrupted time series analyses of
purchases
Katrine T. EjlerskovID1, Stephen J. SharpID1, Martine SteadID2, Ashley J. Adamson3,
Martin WhiteID1, Jean AdamsID1*
1 Centre for Diet and Activity Research, MRC Epidemiology Unit, University of Cambridge, Cambridge,
United Kingdom, 2 Institute for Social Marketing, Faculty of Health Sciences and Sport, University of Stirling,
Stirling, United Kingdom, 3 Institute of Health & Society and the Human Nutrition Research Centre,
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom
* jma79@medschl.cam.ac.uk
Abstract
Background
In response to public concerns and campaigns, some United Kingdom supermarkets have
implemented policies to reduce less-healthy food at checkouts. We explored the effects of
these policies on purchases of less-healthy foods commonly displayed at checkouts.
Methods and findings
We used a natural experimental design and two data sources providing complementary and
unique information. We analysed data on purchases of small packages of common, less-
healthy, checkout foods (sugary confectionary, chocolate, and potato crisps) from 2013 to
2017 from nine UK supermarkets (Aldi, Asda, Co-op, Lidl, M&S, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s,
Tesco, and Waitrose). Six supermarkets implemented a checkout food policy between 2013
and 2017 and were considered intervention stores; the remainder were comparators.
Firstly, we studied the longitudinal association between implementation of checkout poli-
cies and purchases taken home. We used data from a large (n� 30,000) household pur-
chase panel of food brought home to conduct controlled interrupted time series analyses of
purchases of less-healthy common checkout foods from 12 months before to 12 months
after implementation. We conducted separate analyses for each intervention supermarket,
using others as comparators. We synthesised results across supermarkets using random
effects meta-analyses. Implementation of a checkout food policy was associated with an
immediate reduction in four-weekly purchases of common checkout foods of 157,000
(72,700–242,800) packages per percentage market share—equivalent to a 17.3% reduc-
tion. This decrease was sustained at 1 year with 185,100 (121,700–248,500) fewer pack-
ages purchased per 4 weeks per percentage market share—equivalent to a 15.5%
reduction. The immediate, but not sustained, effect was robust to sensitivity analysis.
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Secondly, we studied the cross-sectional association between checkout food policies
and purchases eaten without being taken home. We used data from a smaller (n� 7,500)
individual purchase panel of food bought and eaten ‘on the go’. We conducted cross-sec-
tional analyses comparing purchases of common checkout foods in 2016–2017 from super-
markets with and without checkout food policies. There were 76.4% (95% confidence
interval 48.6%–89.1%) fewer annual purchases of less-healthy common checkout foods
from supermarkets with versus without checkout food policies.
The main limitations of the study are that we do not know where in the store purchases
were selected and cannot determine the effect of changes in purchases on consumption.
Other interventions may also have been responsible for the results seen.
Conclusions
There is a potential impact of checkout food polices on purchases. Voluntary supermarket-
led activities may have public health benefits.
Author summary
Why was this study done?
• Supermarkets often make changes in-store that can influence what people buy. Some of
these changes may lead to improvements in the quality of people’s diets.
• A number of UK supermarkets have introduced policies on what food should and
should not be displayed at their checkouts.
• Previous work has found that supermarkets with checkout food policies have less food
at their checkouts, and the food that is there is likely to be healthier than the food in
supermarkets without checkout food policies. It is not known whether these changes
lead to changes in what people buy.
What did the researchers do and find?
• We used data from more than 30,000 UK households who recorded all the food they
bought and brought home during 2013–2017. We found that about 17% fewer small
packages of sugary confectionary, chocolate, and potato crisps were bought and taken
home from supermarkets immediately after they announced a checkout food policy.
One year after, the difference was about 16% fewer.
• We also used data from about 7,500 people who recorded all the food they bought and
ate without bringing home. In 2016 and 2017, about 76% fewer small packages of sugary
confectionary, chocolate, and potato crisps were bought and eaten ‘on the go’ from
supermarkets with checkout food policies compared to those without.
Supermarket policies on less healthy food at checkouts
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What do these findings mean?
• Because this is not a trial, we cannot be sure that the changes in purchases we recorded
are due to checkout food policies. Nor do we know if there were any other changes in
what people bought or ate. However, these policies could help people to eat better.
Introduction
In most industrialised countries, large supermarket chains have captured the majority of the
grocery market [1]. Although retailers are clearly responsive to consumer demand, they also
play a major role in shaping food preferences and purchasing behaviour [1–3].
Retail practices such as product displays, placement, promotions, and pricing are an impor-
tant component of the context for consumers’ choices in stores [4], and there is evidence that
these can encourage purchases [1,3,5]. One example of in-store marketing is the positioning of
food at supermarket checkouts. Checkouts provide a unique location for prompting purchases,
as all customers have to pass through them to pay and may spend considerable time in queues.
Internationally, the majority of food at supermarket checkouts is of the type that governmental
recommendations do not encourage greater consumption of [6–10].
In response to consumer demand and calls by governments and civil society to play a more
active public health role, supermarket-led activities with the potential to promote healthier
diets are becoming more common [1]. In the UK, advocacy groups [11–13], the media [14],
and researchers [10] have voiced ongoing concern about the nutritional quality of food at
supermarket checkouts. Over the last decade, many UK supermarket groups have pledged to
provide healthier checkout foods [13,15]. These are voluntary, supermarket-led commitments
unrelated to specific government action. Although these policies are rarely identified by super-
markets as having an explicit public health intent, they have the potential to impact public
health via impacts on purchasing and consumption of less-healthy foods.
We previously demonstrated that supermarkets with checkout food policies displayed fewer
checkout foods, with a lower proportion of these foods being less-healthy (as defined by the
UK Food Standards Agency’s Nutrient Profile Model) [16], compared with supermarkets with
no policies [15,17]. Furthermore, in one city, we found no evidence that foods near, but not at,
checkouts in supermarkets with checkout food policies were more likely to be less-healthy than
those in supermarkets without checkout food policies [17]. This suggests that supermarkets do
not necessarily undermine their policies by moving less-healthy [16] checkout food to the
immediate vicinity of checkouts. These findings suggest that voluntary actions by supermarkets
can be in line with public health goals. However, the impact of these policies on purchasing
behaviour has not been determined. It is, for example, possible that checkout food policies sim-
ply displace purchasing of products from checkout areas to elsewhere in stores.
In this paper, we explore the immediate, sustained, and longer-term associations between
the introduction of supermarket checkout food policies and purchases of foods commonly dis-
played at checkouts.
Methods
Outline of evaluative strategy
A well-conducted randomised controlled trial would be the strongest test of the effect of super-
market checkout food policies. However, these policies were not researcher-led and were
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introduced rapidly without the opportunity for randomisation, and formal control groups
may have been unacceptable to retailers. Instead, we used a pragmatic, natural experimental
design [18] using data that were collected for other purposes. We conducted two complemen-
tary sets of analyses using different data sources to address our aims. Alone, neither data
source is ideal. Together, they provide two complementary and unique datasets.
Firstly, we used data on food purchases brought into the home reported by a large UK com-
mercial household purchase panel (data available since 2013). We performed controlled inter-
rupted time series analyses exploring four-weekly purchases of common checkout foods
(defined below) before and after implementation of checkout food policies. We conducted sep-
arate analyses for each supermarket group that implemented a checkout food policy and
synthesised results at 4 weeks and 12 months post implementation using meta-analysis. We
refer to these as the ‘longitudinal’ analyses, capturing immediate and sustained effects.
Although these data capture a large proportion of purchases, they do not capture purchases of
items that are consumed before being brought home.
To better capture purchases not brought home, we additionally used data on food pur-
chases bought and eaten ‘on the go’ without ever being brought home, using a smaller UK
commercial individual purchase panel. However, as these data were only available in 2016–
2017, longitudinal analyses were not possible. Instead, we conducted cross-sectional analyses
of purchases of common checkout foods in 2016–2017 comparing supermarkets with and
without checkout food policies at that time. We refer to this as the ‘cross-sectional’ analysis,
capturing long-term effects.
Supermarkets and checkout food policies
Nine national supermarket groups (referred to in this paper as supermarkets) covering all 14
store formats associated with these supermarkets and representing more than 90% of the UK
grocery market share [19,20] were included: Aldi, Asda, Coop, Lidl, M&S, Morrisons, Sains-
bury’s, Tesco, and Waitrose. As our intention was to study associations between checkout food
policies and purchases rather than ‘name and shame’ particular supermarkets, supermarkets
are anonymised throughout.
Intervention supermarkets were defined as those that changed their checkout food policy
between January 2014 (1 year after purchasing data became available) and July 2016 (1 year
before we obtained data). Of the nine supermarkets considered, six met the criteria for being
intervention supermarkets. A further two implemented checkout food policies before the
study period began, and another had no checkout food policy throughout the study period
[20]; together, these three were used as comparators that did not change their checkout food
policies during the study period.
Information on checkout food policies was from our previous survey [15]. We first searched
supermarkets’ annual reports, web pages, and press releases for relevant information. If this did
not provide the detail we needed, we contacted supermarket customer services by letter, phone,
or email. As a last resort, we used information in newspapers or other secondary sources.
Checkout food policies were categorised into three groups as described previously [15]: ‘clear
and consistent’ policies, ‘vague or inconsistent’ policies, and no policy. Clear and consistent
policies were those that provided clear and specific information on which products would be
removed and what products they should be replaced with (e.g., sweets and chocolate replaced
with ‘healthier options including dried fruit, nuts, juices and water’) and which applied to all
checkouts within a supermarket group or format. Vague or inconsistent policies were those
that provided vague and nonspecific information on products to be removed or introduced
‘and/or’ policies that did not apply to all checkouts within a group or format (e.g., ‘limit display
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of confectionary to one in three checkouts’, no information on replacement products pro-
vided). Policies were heterogeneous in terms of the specifics of foods to be removed, replace-
ment foods, and checkouts they applied to. Of the six intervention supermarkets, three
introduced clear and consistent policies, and three introduced vague or inconsistent policies.
One comparator supermarket introduced a vague or inconsistent policy in their large-for-
mat stores in 2004 but not in their convenience stores. In the longitudinal analyses, these two
store formats were combined because the small volume of four-weekly purchases in the conve-
nience stores was too variable to provide reliable data, and the supermarket was used as a com-
parator. In the cross-sectional analysis using annual data, the two store formats were included
separately.
Definition of common checkout foods
Common checkout foods were selected based on our large survey of checkout food in 69
branches of included supermarkets [15]. Here we focus on the most common food categories
from that survey that featured the highest proportion of less-healthy foods (as defined by the
Food Standards Agency’s Nutrient Profile Model) [16]: sugary confectionery (i.e., sweets or
candy; present in 31% of customer checkout journeys, with 97% being less-healthy), chocolate
(present in 23% of checkout journeys, with 100% less-healthy), and potato crisps (i.e., potato
chips; present in 21% of checkout journeys, with 71% less-healthy). As neither purchase panel
identified where in the store products were selected, we focused on single-serve and smaller
package sizes, which are more likely to be found at checkouts [15]. Thus, in both analyses, we
included purchases of sugary confectionery in single-unit packages of�225 g, chocolate in
packages of�125 g, and crisps in packages of�50 g. Purchases in all three groups were aggre-
gated for analyses and are collectively termed ‘common checkout foods’ throughout.
Purchase data, market share, and demographic characteristics of customers
For the longitudinal analyses, supermarket-specific data on purchases of common checkout
foods were extracted from Kantar Worldpanel’s ‘Take-home’ panel (https://www.
kantarworldpanel.com/global/Consumer-Panels/FMCG). This is a commercial, continuously
refreshed panel of UK households (n� 30,000). Participating households record all food and
beverage purchases brought into the home, using an electronic scanner. Information captured
includes purchase location, product line, and package size. Using quota sampling, the panel is
broadly representative of the UK in terms of region, occupational social class, age of main
shopper, and number of children in the household. Households receive monetary incentives
for taking part, and quality control procedures exclude those that do not record minimum
purchase volume and spend criteria. Most households stay in the panel for 2–3 years. Data
from this panel have been found to reflect data from the Living Costs and Foods Survey—a
government-funded cross-sectional household consumption survey [21].
We obtained data on the number of packages of common checkout foods purchased from
each included supermarket, aggregated into four-weekly periods and weighted and uplifted by
Kantar to represent the total UK market (n = 27,385,050 households). We did not have access
to household-level purchase data. For intervention supermarkets, we obtained data for the 13
four-weekly periods before and 13 four-weekly periods after implementation (26 data points).
For comparator supermarkets, we obtained data for the full period January 2013–February
2017 (54 data points) (see Fig 1).
For the cross-sectional analysis, supermarket-specific data on purchases of common check-
out foods were extracted from Kantar Worldpanel’s ‘Out of Home’ panel (https://www.
kantarworldpanel.com/global/Consumer-Panels/Out-of-Home). This is a subsample of
Supermarket policies on less healthy food at checkouts
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Fig 1. Temporal availability of data used in longitudinal analysis, by supermarket.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002712.g001
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individuals in households in the ‘Take-home’ panel (n� 7,500 individuals). These individuals
additionally record all purchases that are consumed without being brought home using a
mobile phone application. The ‘Out of Home’ panel was initiated in September 2015. We
obtained data on the number of packages of common checkout foods purchased, aggregated
into annual periods for 2016 and 2017 and weighted and uplifted by Kantar to represent the
total UK market that the panel represents (n = 50,398,000 individuals aged 13–79 years). We
did not have access to individual-level data or purchases over a smaller unit of time than 1
year.
Different supermarkets have different market shares. Thus, similar absolute changes in
number of packages purchased from different supermarkets may represent different relative
changes. To take account of this, we obtained rolling 12-weekly market share for each super-
market, also from Kantar. No information on market share was provided for one intervention
supermarket, so we estimated it from 2017 annual reports.
Supermarkets also differ in terms of the demographic composition of their customers. To
adjust for this in the cross-sectional analysis, we obtained information on the percentage of
grocery spend by shoppers in different social grades and age groups in each supermarket from
Kantar. Occupational social grade of the highest household earner was based on the Market
Research Society coding [22] (AB [most affluent], C1, C2, D, and E [least affluent, unem-
ployed, and retired]). Age was of the main household shopper (<28 years, 28–34 years, 35–44
years, 45–54 years, 55–64 years, and 65+ years). A ‘shopper mean social grade’ variable for
each supermarket was calculated as the weighted mean value of social grade (social grade AB
assigned a value of 5, C1 assigned a value of 4, and so on), using the proportion of grocery
spend by each social grade in the particular supermarket as weights. Similarly, a ‘shopper
mean age’ variable for each supermarket was calculated using the mid-range age within each
age group and the proportion of grocery spend by each age group in the supermarket as
weights.
Data analysis
In the longitudinal analysis, controlled interrupted time series models were fitted [23,24], and
we report results according to the recommendations described by Jandoc and colleagues [25].
Interrupted time series models involve plotting a regression line of the outcome grouped by
time (here, purchases of common checkout foods per 4 weeks) against time. The slope of the
preintervention trend is then carried forward after the ‘interruption’ (here, implementation of
checkout food policies) as the ‘counterfactual’ of what was expected to happen had the inter-
vention not occurred and compared to a similar regression line calculated from observations
of what did happen following the interruption. Estimates of both the change in ‘level’ and
‘trend’ of the observed versus counterfactual regression lines are calculated. The level change is
the difference in intercepts between regression lines estimated from observations before and
after the interruption, whereas the trend change is the difference in slopes. Including a com-
parator group allows stronger estimation of the counterfactual of what would have been
expected to happen had the intervention not occurred—from both the preimplementation
data in the intervention case and the difference in preimplementation curves between inter-
vention and comparator. The point of comparison is this counterfactual of what would have
been expected to happen had the intervention not occurred.
We explored the association between implementation of checkout food policies and pur-
chases of common checkout food over the period from 13 four-weekly periods (12 months)
before implementation to 13 four-weekly periods (12 months) after implementation. As the
intervention supermarkets have different customer bases, all implemented checkout food
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policies at different time points; and because different comparators were appropriate for each
intervention supermarket (see below), we conducted separate analyses for each intervention
supermarket. Aggregating data at the four-weekly period provided an optimal balance between
a time period that was short enough to provide an adequate number of data points over 1 year
to meet the minimum data requirements of interrupted time series analysis [24] and long
enough to avoid unnecessary point-to-point ‘noise’.
Most supermarkets showed marked seasonal variations in purchases of foods commonly
displayed at checkouts, with purchases appearing to peak around Valentine’s Day, Easter, and
Christmas. Using a control group in interrupted time series models reduces the impact of such
time-varying confounding [23]. A suitable control group should show a similar preimplemen-
tation curve, although not necessarily at the same level. Of the three comparison supermarkets
available, two had a checkout food policy throughout the study period, and one had no policy
throughout. This provided four comparison options: either of the three individually or a mean
of the three. In the main analyses, we selected from these four options based on the visual simi-
larity of preimplementation purchase curves. For one of the intervention supermarkets, none
of the comparison options had similar preintervention purchase curves, and an uncontrolled
model was used. To explore the sensitivity of our findings to the comparison group selected,
we repeated all analyses using the mean values of the three comparison supermarkets
throughout.
We adjusted models for four-weekly period (13 periods per year, so 12 indicator variables),
Easter (because unlike other celebrations, its date varies from year to year; included as an indi-
cator variable if the date fell in different four-weekly periods between years), and market share.
Alternatives to four-weekly period indicator variables were considered to adjust for season,
but none improved model fit.
Generalised least squares regression models were used assuming a normally distributed
outcome and allowing for autoregressive and moving average correlation structures as appro-
priate. For each model, the fits of different autoregressive-moving-average models were com-
pared with likelihood-ratio tests. Final models were chosen based on lower values of the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), as well as by
visually assessing plots (see S1 Table). More parsimonious models were preferred when possi-
ble. To account for differences in market share between supermarkets and for any changes in
these over time, estimated values in the 4 weeks immediately following implementation and
the 12 months after implementation were divided by the relevant market share of each super-
market at the relevant point in time. Thus, the outcome in these analyses is units of common
checkout foods purchased per 4 weeks per percentage market share. This allowed any change
in custom associated with interventions to be taken into account and changes associated with
implementation of checkout food policies in supermarkets with different markets shares to be
more comparable.
The generalised linear models took the general form of
Purchasesfi � bf Trendf þ biInterventioni þ bfiTrendInterventionfi þ bf Policyf
þbf PolicyTrendf þ bfiPolicyInterventionfi
þbfiTrendInteventionPolicyfi þ btMarketsharet þ bf Easterf þ bf Fourweekf þ εfi
where Purchases denotes four-weekly unit purchases of common checkout foods, Trend
denotes the overall four-weekly linear trend, Intervention denotes the indicator for interven-
tion versus comparator supermarket, TrendIntervention denotes the intervention supermar-
ket-specific four-weekly linear trend, Policy denotes an indicator for the period after checkout
food policy implementation, PolicyTrend denotes the four-weekly linear trend after policy
Supermarket policies on less healthy food at checkouts
PLOS Medicine | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002712 December 18, 2018 8 / 20
implementation, PolicyIntervention denotes the intervention supermarket-specific indicator
for the period after checkout food policy implementation, TrendInterventionPolicy denotes the
intervention supermarket-specific four-weekly linear trend after checkout food policy imple-
mentation, Marketshare denotes the 12-weekly percentage market share, Easter denotes an
indicator for Easter, Fourweek denotes the vector of four-weekly period indicators, and ε rep-
resents the error term. The subscript f corresponds to four-weekly-specific variables (1–26),
and i corresponds to intervention-specific variables.
Absolute and percentage differences between observed and counterfactual values in the
4-week period immediately after and 12 months after policy implementation were derived
from the models. We used random effects meta-analysis [26] to synthesize these differences at
4 weeks and 12 months from different supermarkets. With only six intervention supermarkets
in the meta-analyses, it was not possible to robustly separate by policy category (clear and con-
sistent versus vague or inconsistent). The weights from the meta-analyses of the absolute dif-
ferences were used to calculate weighted average percentage changes.
In the cross-sectional analysis, the association of checkout food policies (clear and consis-
tent, vague or inconsistent, or no policy) with annual purchases of common checkout foods
was estimated using a linear regression model, including supermarket group as a random
effect. Here, the outcome variable was annual purchases of common checkout foods weighted
and uplifted by Kantar, divided by annual market share, and log transformed, where appropri-
ate. The exposure variable was checkout food policy type. The model was adjusted for year,
‘shopper mean age’, and ‘shopper mean social grade’. Log-transformed results were back con-
verted to ratios for presentation and interpretation.
Data preparation, cross-sectional analyses, and meta-analyses were performed using Stata/
SE v14.2 [27]. Interrupted time series models were fitted using R v3.3.1 [28].
Ethics, research governance, and data sharing
Ethical approval was not required for these analyses of aggregate anonymised purchase data.
Our commercial agreement with Kantar does not permit us to share data. All data are available
to other researchers directly from Kantar (see www.kantarworldpanel.com/en for contact
details).
The prospectively written proposal is included as a supporting information file (see S1
Text). The only deviation to the original proposal was additional inclusion of the cross-sec-
tional data, which we were not aware of at the time of writing the proposal but which we feel
add substantial strength to the analyses.
This paper is written in accordance with the STROBE statement (see S2 Table).
Results
Longitudinal analyses
Table 1 summarises the data used in the longitudinal analyses. Of nine included supermarkets,
six implemented a new checkout food policy during the study period, three of which were
clear and consistent and three of which were vague or inconsistent. The remaining three
supermarkets did not implement new checkout food policies during the study period and were
used as comparators. Two of these introduced vague or inconsistent policies before the study
period began, and one had no policy throughout. Median 12-weekly supermarket market
share varied from 3.1% (supermarkets 1 and 5) to 28.7% (supermarket 2). Median four-weekly
purchases of common checkout foods per supermarket varied from 2,517,000 to 29,045,000
units.
Supermarket policies on less healthy food at checkouts
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Table 2 summarises the results from the interrupted time series analysis models for
each supermarket, showing estimates of immediate level and trend change as well as differ-
ences in purchases at 12 months. Fig 2 shows trends in purchases of common checkout foods
for each pair of intervention and comparator from 12 months before to 12 months after
implementation.
Of three supermarkets that implemented clear and consistent policies (supermarkets 1, 2,
and 3), there was a statistically significant immediate reduction (negative level change) in pur-
chases of common checkout foods compared to the counterfactual associated with implemen-
tation policies in two cases (supermarkets 2 and 3). This was associated with a statistically
significant change in trend and change in purchases at 12 months in supermarket 2 only.
Of three instances when a vague or inconsistent checkout food policy was introduced
(supermarkets 4, 5, and 6), this was associated with a statistically significant immediate reduc-
tion in purchases of common checkout foods compared to the counterfactual in only one
supermarket (supermarket 4). However, this change was sustained at 12 months. In the other
two instances, no significant changes in level or trend of purchases of common checkout foods
Table 1. Description of included supermarkets and data in longitudinal analyses.
Supermarket Checkout food policy
type
Intervention or
comparator
12-weekly market share (%), median [IQR] Purchases of common checkout foods (1,000s of
units/4 week), median [IQR]
Preimplementation Post implementation Preimplementation Post implementation
1 Clear and consistent Intervention 3.0 [2.9–3.1] 3.6 [3.5–3.6] 4,003 [3,748–4,425] 4,539 [3,585–5,151]
2 Clear and consistent Intervention 28.9 [28.8–29.1] 28.4 [28.2–28.6] 27,998 [25,438–29,364] 28,336 [27,239–31,126]
3 Clear and consistent Intervention 4.8 [4.6–4.8] 5.5 [5.4–5.6] 4,778 [4,386–5,525] 4,716 [4,364–5,151]
4 Vague or inconsistent Intervention 4.9 [4.8–5.0] 5.1 [5.1–5.2] 2,851 [2,274–3,363] 3,247 [2,927–3,350]
5 Vague or inconsistent Intervention 3.1a 3.1a 2,306 [2,36–2,661] 2,644 [2,343–2,800]
6 Vague or inconsistent Intervention 10.9 [10.8–11.0] 10.6 [10.5–10.8] 10,531 [9,690–11,561] 10,678 [9,902–11,462]
7 Vague or inconsistent Comparator NA 16.9 [16.2–17.2] NA 15,591.5 [13,288–16,656]
8 Vague or inconsistent Comparator NA 16.5 [16.4–16.8] NA 12,241 [10,652–14,212]
9 Absent Comparator 6.2 [6.1–6.4] NA 10,221 [9,37–10,918] NA
aEstimated from 2017 annual reports.
Abbreviations: IQR, interquartile range; NA, not applicable.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002712.t001
Table 2. Summary of the longitudinal associations between implementation of checkout food policies and purchases of common checkout foods, estimated from
interrupted time series models (best-fit comparison group).
Intervention
supermarket
1,000s of units of common checkout food purchases per % market share per 4 weeks (95% CI)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Comparison
supermarket
9 8 Mean of 7, 8, 9 9 None Mean of 7, 8, 9
Level change (4 weeks) −461.6 (−1,016.3 to
93.1)
−108.7 (−137.1 to
−80.4)
−435.8 (−690.0 to
−181.5)
−178.7 (−294.0 to
−63.3)
−54.2 (−274.8 to
166.4)
−118.1 (−326.9 to
90.7)
Trend change −6.8 (−25.0 to 11.5) −6.1 (−10.3 to −1.9) 14.8 (−11.4 to 41.0) −2.7 (−14.2 to 8.8) 1.3 (−12.8 to 15.4) −3.1 (−32.1 to 25.9)
Change (at 12 months) −483.6 (−994.2 to
21.1)
−194.0 (−270.9 to
−117.1)
−212.2 (−549.0 to
124.6)
−205.7 (−370.4 to
−40.9)
−37.3 (−243.4 to
168.9)
−158.3 (−538.3 to
221.6)
All models are adjusted for market share, four-weekly time point, and Easter (if Easter fell in different four-weekly periods between years).
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002712.t002
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compared to the counterfactual were associated with the introduction of checkout food poli-
cies (supermarkets 5 and 6).
Meta-analyses of these results are shown in Figs 3 and 4. Overall, implementation of super-
market checkout food policies was associated with a statistically significant decrease in pur-
chases of common checkout foods of 157,700 packages per percentage market share in the 4
weeks following policy implementation (95% confidence interval [CI] 72,700–242,800 pack-
ages decrease, Fig 3) compared to the counterfactual. This effect was sustained at 12 months
post implementation (Fig 4; 185,100 packages decrease per percentage market share [95% CI
121,700–248,500]). The weighted average percentage change in purchases compared to the
counterfactual was −17.3% in the 4 weeks following implementation and −15.5% after 12
months.
The sensitivity analysis using mean values for the three comparison supermarkets for all
analyses revealed a similar pattern of results to those described here (see S3 Table, S1, S2 and
S3 Figs), except that the effect was diminished and no longer significant 12 months after
implementation.
Cross-sectional analyses
Table 3 describes market share and purchase data used in the cross-sectional analysis. As
before, for each supermarket, year-to-year variation in market share was modest, but year-to-
year variation in purchases of common checkout foods was more pronounced.
Fig 2. Interrupted time series models: Association between checkout food policy implementation and purchases of common checkout foods. ‘Best fit’
comparison group. Panel number indicates intervention store number as used elsewhere. Vertical black dotted line = time of implementation. Red line = intervention
store, red dotted line = counterfactual, blue line = comparison store.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002712.g002
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The linear regression model used in the cross-sectional analysis is summarised in Table 4.
There were statistically significant fewer annual unit purchases of common checkout foods per
percentage market share from supermarkets with checkout food policies than from supermar-
kets with no checkout food policy. The absolute differences reported in Table 4 are comparable
to a 75.3% (95% CI 45.4%–88.8%) reduction in supermarkets with vague or inconsistent poli-
cies compared to none and a 79.5% (95% CI 44.7%–92.4%) reduction in supermarkets with
clear and consistent policies versus none. There was no evidence of difference in purchases by
policy category (p = 0.61), year, supermarket mean age, or social grade.
Discussion
This is the first study we are aware of to evaluate the impact of voluntary supermarket-led
checkout food policies on purchases. It contributes to the small but growing literature on
industry-led activities to promote healthier diets [29–33]. We conducted a pragmatic natural
experimental evaluation of the introduction of checkout food policies in six of nine large UK
supermarket chains, using two different but complementary data sources. In a longitudinal
analysis of purchases brought into the home, we found that implementation of a checkout
food policy was associated with a significant immediate reduction in purchases of single-serve
Fig 3. Meta-analysis: Association between checkout food policy implementation and purchases of common checkout foods, 4 weeks. ‘Best fit’ comparison group.
CI, confidence interval.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002712.g003
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Fig 4. Meta-analysis: Association between checkout food policy implementation and purchases of common checkout foods, 12 months. ‘Best fit’ comparison
group. CI, confidence interval.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002712.g004
Table 3. Description of data used in cross-sectional analysis.
Supermarket group Checkout food policy category UK grocery market share (%) Annual unit purchases of common
checkout foods (1,000s)
2016 2017 2016 2017
1 Clear and consistent 4.3 4.7 15,203 18,752
2 Clear and consistent 28 27.5 218,200 247,600
3 Clear and consistent 6.0 7.0 16,313 14,585
4 Vague or inconsistent 5.0 4.7 17,066 14,870
5 Vague or inconsistent 3.1a 3.1a 30,603 34,097
6 Vague or inconsistent 10.3 10.0 90,969 54,069
7 Vague or inconsistent 15.0 15.0 100,100 114,700
8a Vague or inconsistent 15.5 14.9 53,484 48,554
8b Absent 0.8 0.9 33,787 34,029
9 Absent 6.2 6.0 94,652 85,991
Total - 94.2 93.8 670,377 667,247
aEstimated from 2017 annual reports.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002712.t003
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or small packages of sugary confectionery, chocolate, and crisps of 17.3%. One year post imple-
mentation, the weighted average percentage change was 15.5% lower than what would have
been expected if a checkout food policy had not been implemented. The immediate, but not
sustained, effect was robust in the sensitivity analysis. In the cross-sectional analysis of pur-
chases consumed ‘on the go’ in 2016 and 2017, we found 75.3%–79.5% fewer purchases of
common checkout foods from supermarkets with versus without checkout food policies, sup-
porting a longer-term effect of supermarket checkout food policies, especially for purchases
eaten without being brought home. The cross-sectional analysis showed no difference between
supermarkets with clear and consistent versus vague or inconsistent checkout food policies.
We were not able to robustly formally test any difference by policy category in the longitudinal
analyses.
Strengths and weaknesses
The controlled, interrupted time series approach used in our longitudinal analyses is one of
the strongest quasi-experimental designs available [25]. In longitudinal analyses, we used pur-
chase data from a large, broadly representative consumer panel. As far as we are aware, this is
the most comprehensive data on UK food purchases available across the full year and at the
product level. As data are multiplied up and weighted to represent all UK households, our
results are likely to be generalisable to the UK. However, retailing environments vary interna-
tionally [7], and our results may not be more widely generalisable.
In longitudinal analyses, we took into account secular trends and seasonal variations in pur-
chases. Including comparison groups reduced the likelihood that the results are due to wider
changes to the grocery market.
Purchases that never enter the home are not recorded by the take-home panel. This was
addressed by additional cross-sectional analyses of on-the-go purchases. The on-the-go panel
is smaller than the take-home panel and only recently established, precluding longitudinal
analyses. However, triangulating different data and analyses lends robustness to natural experi-
mental evaluations [18].
By focusing on supermarket purchases, we were unable to account for purchases displaced
to non-supermarket locations—a previously reported response to supermarket interventions
[34]. By expressing our longitudinal results as units purchased per percentage market share,
we are able to take account of any overall movement of shoppers between supermarkets. By
adjusting for mean shopper characteristics in the cross-sectional analyses, we determined that
results are independent of who shops at different supermarkets. However, there may have
Table 4. Summary of the cross-sectional association between presence and nature of checkout food policies and
purchases of common checkout foods, estimated from linear regression models.
Variable Level Annual unit purchases of common checkout
food per percent market share in 1,000s (95% CI)
Checkout food policy status None Reference
Vague or inconsistent −22,400 (−32,100 to −12,700)
Clear and consistent −25,000 (−37,100 to −12,900)
Year 2016 Reference
2017 −610 (−1,733 to 514)
Supermarket mean age - - −840 (−2,896 to 1,216)
Supermarket mean social grade - - 11,800 (−9,317 to 33,000)
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002712.t004
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been selective movement of particular types of shoppers associated with implementation of
interventions that we were not able to take account of. Nor did we have information on where
in the store purchases were selected. We restricted our analyses to smaller, single-serve pack-
age sizes to increase the likelihood that purchases were from checkouts. However, this may be
neither sensitive nor specific. As we do not have information on purchases of sugary confec-
tionery, chocolate, and crisps in larger package sizes, we also do not know if purchases were
displaced from smaller to larger packages. This could be an area of future research. We have
assumed that all supermarkets are comparable. However, some supermarket groups include
larger proportions of convenience compared to larger stores. There may be greater sales of
smaller package sizes from convenience stores.
The data we had access to combined purchases from all formats within each supermarket
group in the longitudinal analysis. It is possible that the association between checkout food
policies and purchases of common checkout food varies by format and that an interaction
exists. Future research could explore this possibility.
As the data were retrospectively obtained, we were not able to take into account potential
store-specific simultaneous interventions that might have taken place during the study period,
which may have influenced either the longitudinal or cross-sectional results. Supermarkets
are, however, continuously innovating. By adding comparison groups to the interrupted time
series analyses and synthesising results from multiple supermarkets that introduced checkout
food policies at different time points, we reduced the potential impact of wider marketing
trends and changing consumer preferences on our results. However, we did not include a
non-checkout food as a comparator.
Both our longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses were observational, and causality cannot
be ascribed. Purchases do not necessarily represent consumption or reflect the composition of
total diet.
Comparison of findings to previous studies
There is some research describing foods displayed at supermarket checkouts [6–10,15,17].
However, we are not aware of previous evaluations of the impact of supermarket-led checkout
food policies on purchases. Our previous survey found that supermarkets with clear and con-
sistent checkout food policies were less likely to display any food, and a lower proportion of
the food they did display was less-healthy, as defined by the Food Standards Agency’s Nutrient
Profiling Model [15,16]. Furthermore, in one city, we found no difference in the healthfulness
of food displayed near but not at checkouts according to checkout food policy [17]. These dif-
ferences in food displayed at and near checkouts according to checkout food policy status may
help to explain the differences in purchases reported here.
A range of researcher-led intervention studies focusing on or including healthier checkout
foods have been conducted [35–39]. These report mixed findings, likely because of variations in
the foods targeted and the level of implementation achieved. In contrast, we previously found a
high level of adherence in those supermarkets with clear and consistent checkout food policies
[15]. This may reflect supermarkets’ commitment to make their own policies work and their
ability to respond adaptively to customer behaviour following implementation. For example,
many different healthier checkout foods may be trialled before the optimum mix is identified.
In contrast to previous researcher-led interventions, with a maximum follow-up of 6
months [35–39], we included a follow-up period of 12 months in the longitudinal analyses.
This allowed us to account for seasonal variations and to determine that short-term changes in
purchases associated with checkout food policy implementation are not necessarily sustained
at 12 months. The cross-sectional analysis allowed us to explore even longer-term effects.
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Given that we found a difference in purchases that was robust to sensitivity analysis immedi-
ately following implementation but not at 12 months, future research should include at least a
12-month follow-up to determine if any early changes are sustained.
Interpretation and implication of findings
In longitudinal analyses, the implementation of checkout food policies was associated with an
immediate decrease in take-home purchases of common checkout foods. Although this was
sustained at 12 months in the main analysis, this was not robust in the sensitivity analysis. In
cross-sectional analyses using data from 2016 to 2017, on-the-go purchases were significantly
lower from supermarkets with versus without checkout food policies. Take-home purchases
may more often be planned [40], whereas on-the-go purchases may more often be impulsive
[2,8]. Our findings indicate that there is a potential impact of checkout food polices on both
impulse and planned purchases.
In our synthesis of longitudinal analyses, we found a statistically significant association
between implementation of checkout food policies and purchases. There was some indication
that the effect was more pronounced in supermarkets with clear and consistent, compared to
vague or inconsistent, policies. The same trend was seen at 12 months post implementation.
Neither of these differences was formally tested, because of small numbers; however, this trend
may reflect our previous findings of greater adherence to clear and consistent, compared to
vague or inconsistent, checkout food polices [15]. Furthermore, research in more-controlled
settings has shown that the balance of healthier foods displayed at checkouts influences cus-
tomers’ behaviour, with healthier foods being more likely to be selected when they were in the
majority [41]. In contrast, in cross-sectional analyses, there was no difference in the magnitude
of effect between supermarkets with a clear and consistent checkout food policy compared to
those with vague or inconsistent policies. This may reflect the differences in purchases
included in the different analysis. ‘Take-home’ purchases captured in the longitudinal analyses
may be differently influenced by different checkout food policies than ‘on-the-go’ purchases
captured in the cross-sectional analysis.
Our findings indicate that supermarket-led activities can influence purchasing and hence
may be an important vehicle to improve population health. In particular, our findings suggest
checkout food policies may be one method to help decrease some purchases of less-healthy
foods. Government-led nutritional standards on checkout food have been suggested [11,13]
and may be attractive to retailers, as they provide a ‘level playing field’. Within supermarkets,
several other interventions to promote healthier purchases have shown potential [42–45].
Food at checkouts has been found to lead to child purchasing requests [6] that parents can
find hard to resist [9]. Anecdotal information from newspaper reports associated with the
introduction of supermarket checkout food policies suggests that supermarkets implement
these to improve the customer experience rather than to achieve any particular public health
goals. That we previously found good adherence to policies [15] suggests that any change in
purchases is outweighed by other benefits supermarkets gain from these policies.
Unanswered questions and future research
Future research should prospectively explore how supermarkets and customers change their
behaviour in response to supermarket-led interventions such as checkout food policies. Data
on the effect of such policies on total diet would allow us to understand their potential for
improving population health. Qualitative data exploring consumers’ views of the retail envi-
ronment and supermarkets’ motivations for introducing policies may help to identify further
opportunities for greater alignment between retail and public health policy. It would also be
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helpful to explore under what circumstances retailers, the public, and politicians would feel
that further regulation in this area would be justified.
Conclusions
The implementation of supermarket checkout food policies was associated with an immediate
reduction in take-home purchases of sugary confectionery, chocolate, and crisps. There was
some indication that this decrease was sustained 1 year post implementation, but this was not
robust to sensitivity analysis. Data collected after implementation of all policies revealed that
on-the-go purchases of common checkout foods appeared to be lower from supermarkets with
versus without checkout food policies. Voluntary supermarket-led activities have the potential
to promote healthier food purchasing.
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